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AMERICAN COURTS ARE DROWNING IN THE
"GENE POOL": EXCAVATING THE SLIPPERY
SLOPE MECHANISMS BEHIND JUDICIAL
ENDORSEMENT OF DNA DATABASES
MEGHAN RILEY*

It is undoubtedly true that, were we to maintainDNA files on all persons living
in this country, we would even more effectively further the public interest in
having efficient and orderly criminal prosecutions,just as we would were we
willing to sacrifice all of our interests in privacy and personal liberty. We
chose, however,
not to follow that course when we adopted the Fourth
1
Amendment.
I. INTRODUCTION

When a federal court of appeals recently reversed itself, narrowly
declaring constitutional a law enforcement search of an individual's genetic
code, absent suspicion and probable cause, Judge Kozinski lamented, "My
colleagues in the plurality assure us that, when [the] day comes, they will
stand vigilant and guard the line, but by then the line - never very clear to
begin with - will have shifted. The fishbowl will look like home."2 Judge
Kozinski is not alone in fearing that these changed expectations will serve to
justify future intrusions, thereby starting the nation down a slippery slope, 3 at
.
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1. United States v. Kincade, 345 F.3d 1095, 1103 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd en banc, 379
F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2004) (6-5 decision).
2. United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 873 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (6-5
decision) (Kozinski, J., dissenting). Judge Kozinski argued that the majority's result could

lead to requiring every citizen to provide DNA for the government-run database, not just
convicted felons. Id. See Maura Dolan & Andrew Blankstein, ParoleeDNA Testing Okd,
L.A. TIMES, August 19, 2004, at BI (discussing Judge Kozinski's dissent in Kincade and
his assertion that the Fourth Amendment intrusion at issue in Kincade is not so much the
taking of blood as it is the seizure of a DNA fingerprint and its inclusion in a searchable
database).
3. A slippery slope is the metaphor describing all situations where one's support for
decision A ends up materially increasing the likelihood that others will bring about
decision B. Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV.
1026, 1031 (2003). "It may be that [this] is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least
repulsive form, but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing in that
way, namely, by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure."
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the end of which every citizen's genetic code will lie in government hands.4
The slippery slope argument, however, seems to fall on deaf ears, while
the voices shouting for a population-wide DNA database grow louder. Why
is this? In the wake of 9/11, are Americans finally willing to do away with
fundamental liberty protections in the name of security? The answer may be
much simpler. It may be ignorance of the basic mechanics 5 of the slippery
slope metaphor itself that blinds Americans to the potential dangers of DNA
6
harvesting.
This Comment will explore the mechanics of the slippery slope
metaphor as they relate to judicial legitimization of DNA databases. Part I
briefly discusses the evolution of DNA collection statutes and law
enforcement-run databases, and then describes the state of the law today. It
also recounts arguments advanced both for and against DNA databases. Part
II explores and challenges the theoretical framework in which judicial
decision makers and supporters of DNA databases are operating, and uses
the slippery slope argument as a means to identify the social, political, and
human mechanisms influencing the judicial opinions in United States v.
Kincade. Part III proposes that the United States Supreme Court safeguard
Fourth Amendment privacy rights by notching the slippery slope created by

See id. at 1112 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886), to illustrate how
slippery slopes can develop through tolerance for small changes).
4. Judge Kozinski explained that when future proposals for expanding the federal
government's DNA database inevitably arise, the database will have been praised for
solving thousands of crimes and we will have become accustomed to the notion that the
government is permitted to hold enormous databases of DNA fingerprints. Kincade, 379
F.3d at 873 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
See Kenneth Jost, DNA Databases: Does Expanding Them Threaten Civil Liberties?, 9

Q. RESEARCHER 449 (1999), available at http://www.denverda.org/
DNADocuments/CQ%20DNA%20Database%20Article.pdf
[hereinafter CONG. Q.
RESEARCHER] (discussing the argument that mandatory DNA profiling of arrestees will
alter the public's attitude toward DNA databases, moving the nation down a slippery slope
leading to "universal genetic registration" and a system "fraught with privacy
CONG.

implications");

D.H. Kaye, The Constitutionality of DNA Sampling on Arrest, 10

(2001) (describing how some law professors, along
with sociology and public health scholars, view DNA data bases "as part of an insidious
,surveillance creep' and 'the first step toward an Orwellian society' that will make 'us a
,nation of suspects," and radically alters the relationship between the citizen and the
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 455, 457

government"); Liza Porteus, Supporters, Critics Debate DNA DatabaseExpansion, FOX

May 9, 2003, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,86390,00.html. (last visited
Dec. 29, 2005)(quoting Jay Stanley, communications director of the Technology and
Liberty Program at the American Civil Liberties Union: "We're heading towards a
situation where the government has incredible personal bodily information about
everybody that cannot only track you.. but it's incredibly revealing about your body, your
future health and characteristics of your family members")
5. See Volokh supra note 3, at 1031-32, 1137 n.14 (explaining the term
"mechanisms" in the context of slippery slope arguments).
NEWS,

6. See Recent Case: Constitutional Law - Fourth Amendment - Ninth Circuit
Upholds Collection of DNA from Parolees.-UnitedStates v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813 (9th
Cir. 2004) (en banc)., 118 HARV. L. REV. 818, 818 (2004) [hereinafter Ninth Circuit

Upholds] (suggesting that the rapid expansion of DNA databases "from minimal to
gargantuan" warrants more public attention and doctrinal rigidity than it has received).
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prior judicial decisions regarding DNA extraction and database storage. It
calls for prohibiting the statutory farming of arrestees' and suspects' DNA
into state and nationwide databases.

I.
A.

BACKGROUND

Law Enforcement DNA Sampling Procedures

DNA, or deoxyribonucleic acid, is a chemical present in the nucleus of
every cell containing an individual's genetic blueprint.7 Because of DNA's
uniqueness, and the accuracy with which it can identify the individual from
which it came, it now serves as an essential crime-solving tool for law
enforcement.8 After collecting DNA from crime scenes, police can attempt
to locate an offender by searching for a matching DNA profile in state and
national databases.'
Forensic lab technicians create the DNA profiles, or "fingerprints," in
the databases using unique variations found in an individual's
chromosomes. 10 Technicians analyze a small portion of the original tissue
sample, and most labs will then preserve and store the remaining tissue.II
The analysis is usually limited to 13 loci that reveal genotypes, or patterns
containing certain non-coding alleles. 12
These unique genotypes are
translated into a numerical code, or profile, and then entered into the local
and national databases.13
B.

Creation and Expansion of DNA Databases

Four years ago, the federal government passed the DNA Analysis
Backlog Elimination Act of 200014 ("DNA Act"), which authorized
extraction of DNA from those convicted of "qualifying federal offenses,"' 5
and subsequent storage of the DNA profile in the Combined DNA Index
System ("CODIS") absent individualized suspicion that the individual
committed some other crime. 16 The FBI maintains CODIS, 7 which is a

7. Lindsy A. Elkins, Note, Five Foot Two With Eyes ofBlue: PhysicalProfilingand
the Prospect of a Genetics-Based CriminalJustice System, 17 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS
& PUB. POL'Y 269, 276 (2003).
8. Vima M. Manuel, Note, State DNA Data Base and Data Bank Expansion Laws: Is
It Time For California to Expand its DNA Data Base Law to Include All Convicted
Felons?, 31 W. ST. U.L. REv. 339, 339 (2004).
9, D.H. Kaye, The Constitutionality of DNA Sampling on Arrest, 10 CORNELL J.L.

PUB. POL'Y 455,462 (2001).
10. Elkins, supra note 7, at 276.
11. Kaye, supra note 9, at 461.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 462
14. 42 U.S.C. § 14135a etseq. (2004)
15. See id. § 14135a (enumerating "qualified offenses" such as murder, offenses
relating to sex abuse, kidnapping, any crimes of violence, and any attempt or conspiracy to
commit these offenses).
16. Id.
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three-tiered system of local, state, and national databases now containing
more than 1.6 million DNA profiles.18
Within the last fifteen years, all fifty states have passed some type of
DNA collection statute requiring some or all convicted felons to submit
DNA - through blood draw or a cheek-swab' 9 - for inclusion in their
databases.2" States have embraced the role of DNA databases as powerful
law enforcement tools and continue to enthusiastically expand the class of
individuals subject to state DNA collection statutes. 21 Every state currently
requires samples from certain sex offenders, but beyond that, each state
varies widely in classifying those subject to inclusion in the DNA
databases.22 Some states even harvest DNA from juveniles, individuals
guilty of certain misdemeanors, and suspects not yet convicted of a crime.23
Furthermore, a number of states have already enacted, or are now proposing
controversial measures that require anyone arrested to submit a DNA
sample.2 4

17. CODIS stands for the Combined DNA Index System Database. United States v.
Miles, 228 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1132 (E.D. Cal. 2002). Its purpose is to match DNA samples
from crime scenes where there is no suspect with the DNA of convicted offenders. Id. at
1139. See Sandra J. Carnahan, The Supreme Court's Primary Purpose Test: A Roadblock
to the National Law Enforcement DNA Database,83 NEB. L. REV. 1, 3 (2004) (explaining
that CODIS is a software program enabling state, federal, and local forensic labs to
electronically store and compare DNA profiles).
18. Editorial, DNA's Double Standard, THE J.NEWS, March 15, 2004; Kaye, supra
note 4, at 462.
19. While blood draw and cheek-swabbing are still used, more modem DNA sampling
procedures include application of an adhesive patch to the skin on an individual's ann to
remove a small layer of epidermal cells. Ben Quarmby, The Case For National DNA
Identification Cards, 2003 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 0002,
20 (2003),
http://www.law.duke.edu/joumals/dltr/articles/2003dltr0002.html (last visited Dec. 29,
2005).
20. Maryland v. Raines, 857 A.2d 19, 23 (Md. 2004); John P. Cronan, Comment, The
Next Frontierof Law Enforcement: A Proposalfor Complete DNA Databanks, 28 AM. J.
CRIM. L. 119, 131-32 (2000).
21. See Kincade, 379 F.3d at 819, n.9 (noting that many state DNA statutes reach
beyond the federal legislation, some mandating the taking of DNA samples from nonviolent offenders and certain arrestees); Carnahan, supra note 17, at 4 (discussing the
"clear trend" in state legislation "toward rapid expansion of the types of crimes requiring
DNA inclusion in the database"); Mark A. Rothstein & Sandra Carnahan, Legal and
Policy Issues in Expanding the Scope of the Law Enforcement Data Banks, 67 BROOK. L.
REV. 127, 128 (2001) (explaining that many states have recently amended their laws to
expand the categories of crimes requiring DNA collection). See also United States v.
Riley, 906 F.2d 841, 854 (2d Cir. 1990) (predicting that growing databases will
"ultimately permit DNA evidence to be used like a giant fingerprint file" linking one
individual to other suspects in similar crimes).
22. Allison Puri, An International DNA Database: Balancing Hope, Privacy, and
Scientific Error, 24 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 341 (2001), available at
http://www.be.edu/bcorg/avp/law/lwsch/joumals/bciclr/24_2/05_TXT.htm.
23. Id.See also LA.REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:609 (West Supp. 2004) (authorizing DNA
extraction from those merely arrested for certain crimes).
24. See D.H. Kaye & Michael E. Smith, DNA Identification Databases: Legality,
Legitimacy, and the Case for Population-Wide Coverage, 2003 WiS. L. REV. 413, 430
(2003) (asserting that "DNA collection during custodial arrests is explicitly authorized in a
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C. Divided Courts and Controversyover the Constitutionalityof DNA
Statutes

Although the United States Supreme Court has yet to address the
constitutional legitimacy of DNA collection statutes, state and federal courts
across the nation are fast becoming unanimous in upholding mandatory DNA
extraction for storage in government-run databases.25 While reviewing
courts "agree on the result, they do not agree on how to get there. 26 The
27
various court decisions rely on one of two Fourth Amendment analyses.
The first is the "totality of the circumstances" balancing test. Using this test,
courts frequently find DNA sampling "reasonable" because a felon's
severely reduced expectation of privacy is outweighed by an overwhelming
government interest; namely, identifying criminals and preventing
recidivism. The second justification takes advantage of the "special needs"
exception. This exception disposes of the reasonable suspicion requirement
if the intrusion serves special governmental needs beyond normal law

few states"); Quarmby, supra note 19, 5 (discussing the trend for "relentless expansion"
of the scope of DNA databases); Dee McAree, Push to Expand DNA Samples Spreads,
NAT'L L. J., April 26, 2004, Vol. 26, No. 34, at 4 (reporting that approval of an Illinois
house bill would compel a tissue or saliva sample for DNA profiling from one suspected
of committing a felony as standard police station arrest and booking procedures, and that
passage of a California ballot initiative would require taking of DNA upon arrest); Bill
Hughes & Richard Liebson, High-tech DNA Raises Questions, THE J. NEWS, April 2,
2004, available at http:/Iwww.thejournalnews.com/newsroom/040204/a0102dnaside.html
(reporting on a proposed New York law that would require anyone arrested to submit a
DNA sample).
25. E.g., Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir. 2004); David Kravets, Appeals
Court OKs US. Law Requiring DNA Test, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., August 19, 2004, at 2.
See People v. Garvin, 812 N.E.2d 773, 781 (I11.App. Ct. 2004) (listing federal and state
cases upholding the constitutionality of suspicionless searches performed on convicted
felon's to extract DNA).
26. Illinois v. Peppers, 817 N.E.2d 1152, 1155 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). See Illinois v.
Ramos, 817 N.E.2d 1110, 1130 (I11.App. Ct. 2004) (Theis, J., concurring) (observing that
"while these courts have uniformly reached the same constitutional result, [the opinions]
contain no uniform analysis and frequently include numerous dissents and concurrences").
27. See Peppers, 817 N.E.2d at 1156 (discussing the two analytical routes taken by
courts to justify forced DNA extraction from certain classes of convicted felons). Courts
have taken two different approaches in their Fourth Amendment analyses: (1) the Fourth
Amendment balancing test where the courts determine the reasonableness of a search by
balancing the government's interest in carrying out the search, the extent to which the
search fufrthers that interest, and the level of intrusion into an individual's privacy; and (2)
the special needs exception, which permits governmental intrusion without a warrant or
probable cause when the intrusion serves special governmental needs beyond the normal
needs of law enforcement. Id. Some judges dispense with the argument that forced DNA
collection from convicted individuals amounts to unconstitutional suspicionless search by
labeling DNA analysis as merely an additional method of prisoner identification, similar to
routine pre-arrest fingerprinting and photographing. Nason v. State of Alaska, 102 P.3d
962, 964 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004). See also Padgett v. Ferrero, 294 F. Supp.2d 1338, 1343
(N.D. Ga. 2003) (holding that convicted felons have only a minimal privacy right in their
identification through DNA collection, if any, and that prisoner's felony conviction alone
provids any individualized suspicion to justify DNA collection).
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enforcement. 28 Despite the inconsistencies in these two approaches, the
decisions 29
serve as green lights for states to continue expanding their DNA
databases.
While many endorse expansion of DNA databases, excitedly hailing
DNA as a potent crime-fighting weapon for the future,3 ° doubt and
opposition regularly surface amongst the fervor. 3 1 Much of the controversy
stems from uncertainty surrounding DNA and what it might eventually
reveal about individuals.32 Many fear the consequences of allowing their
28. See Richard P. Shafer, Validity, Construction, and Application of DNA Analysis
Backlog EliminationAct of 2000, 42 U.S.CA. §§ 14135 et seq. and 10 U.S.C.A. § 1565,
187 A.L.R. FED. 373, at 373-77 (2004) (discussing cases where courts held that collection
of DNA samples under the DNA Act is not violative of the Fourth Amendment, finding it
"reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment balancing test, or finding it valid under the
"special needs" doctrine); Groceman v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 354 F.3d 411-14 (5th Cir.
2004) (finding that collection of DNA from prisoners after conviction for inclusion in a
database is reasonable because such prisoners no longer hold a privacy interest in their
accurate identification).
29. In addition to the Federal DNA Act, in the last fifteen years, state governments
began to enact DNA statutes of their own. Raines, 857 A.2d at 23. Currently all fifty
states have some type of DNA collection statute requiring some or all convicted felons to
submit either a blood, saliva, or other tissue sample, for DNA profile analysis and storage
in a DNA data bank. Id. See, e.g., United States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132, 1146 (10th
Cir. 2003) (justifying forced DNA extraction from a federal prisoner for inclusion in
CODIS as a valid suspicionless search under the special needs doctrine). See generally
Bonnie L. Taylor, Storing DNA Samples of Non-Convicted Persons & the Debate Over
DNA Database Expansion, 20 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 509 (2003) (addressing the
expansion of DNA databases). In the last 10 years states continue to broaden their DNA
statutes, subjecting a greater number of people to mandatory DNA extraction in an effort
to fill DNA databases. Id. See Lawrence Hurley, Fractured Md. Court of Appeals
Outlines Why DNA Collection Act is Constitutional,THE DAILY REC. (Baltimore), August
27, 2004, at 1 (reporting on a recent decision by the Maryland Court of Appeals and how
"the court's decision gives the green light to law enforcement agencies seeking to take
DNA samples from other people who, along with prison inmates, have a 'diminished
expectation of privacy,' a class that could include those applying for driving licenses or
passports").
30. See Richard Willing, White House Seeks to Expand DNA Database,USA TODAY,
April 15, 2003, at 13A, availableat http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2003-0415-dna-usatx.htm (quoting assistant U.S. attorney Deborah Daniels's assertion that "[t]he
widespread use of DNA evidence is the future of law enforcement in this country");
CONG. Q. RESEARCHER, supra note 4, at 458, 460 (describing the growing "infatuation"
with DNA as a law enforcement tool and how prosecutors became "enamored" with it and
judges and juries "seemingly impressed").
31. See DNA Database Nears Two Million, BBC NEWS, June 25, 2003,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/lihi/uk/3018504.stm (last visited Dec. 27, 2005)(describing DNA
evidence as a "potent weapon against all categories of crime," and discussing concerns
that the government might be creating a national DNA database "by stealth"); Willing,
supra note 30 (reporting on proposed expansion of national DNA database to include
juveniles and arrestees, and the arguments promoting and opposing the expansion); Sonia
E. Miller, Converging Technologies, 104 N.Y. L. J. 1, 5, (2001) [hereinafter Converging
Technologies] (discussing DNA's potential for both use and misuse, and how "it has
fueled enormous controversy").
32. Although law enforcement refers to the DNA profile as a genetic "fingerprint," the
analogy over-simplifies this relationship. Jeffrey S. Grand, Note, The Blooding of
America: Privacy and the DNA Dragnet,23 CARDOZO L. REV. 2277, 2288 (2002). Even
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DNA to fall into the hands of insurance companies, employers, or other
private institutions that may be tempted to use such unique personal
information for discriminatory purposes.33 But what concerns many scholars
is that decisions to broaden the scope of the DNA databases are driven
purely by law enforcement concerns, which implement changes that bring
"far-reaching consequences that none of us can anticipate. 3 4
Despite the line of cases upholding statutes requiring DNA extraction
from certain convicted felons, the judicial opinions reflect an undercurrent of
controversy and uncertainty surrounding the permissible extent of
government control over one's genetic information.35
The media
increasingly points to recent appellate court opinions upholding DNA
collection statutes and databases, characterizing these courts as "fractured,"
if current profiling methods use comparatively limited amounts of genetic information,
with more advanced mapping of the human genome now underway, DNA analysis may
well reveal an individual's medical history, vulnerability to certain diseases, hereditary
information such as race, and physical and behavioral traits. Id. Unlike a fingerprint,
"information potentially contained in a DNA profile may subject an individual to
embarrassment, humiliation, public hostility, and even financial harm." Id. at 2289.
Despite characterizations of DNA profiling as the modem version of fingerprinting, civil
libertarians and other commentators fear "unfettered government-sponsored bioinvasion"
and exposure to the government of "who I am, my biological potential, my health
situation, my paternity, my race [and the] most profound personal secrets." David H.
Kaye, Commentary, Two Fallacies About DNA Data Banks for Law Enforcement, 67
BROOK. L. REV. 179, 181-82 (2001). See Converging Technologies, supra note 31, at 5
(discussing DNA's potential use as a tool used to explain behavior under a wide range of
circumstances, external conditions, or behavioral genetics, and how it might lead to
unprecedented and dangerous terrain); Elkins, supra note 7, at 271 (pointing to the risk
that DNA profiling by law enforcement will cause social setbacks by reinforcing notions
that criminal behavior is a biological problem, thereby creating tendencies to pursue one
class of individuals disproportionately).
33. See Barry Steinhardt, Should DNA Samples be Collected from Arrestees and
Included in Law Enforcement Databases?, 9 CONG. Q. RESEARCHER, May 28, 1999, at
465 (debating against expansion of DNA databases by pointing out the country's long
history of creating databases for one purpose but later employing them for additional
functions, such as the census records used at first for the limited statistical purposes but
later used to gather up and confine innocent Japanese-Americans during World War 11);
Gaia Bernstein, Accommodating Technological Innovation: Identity, Genetic Testing and
the Internet, 57 VAND L. REV. 965, 991 (2004) (asserting that genetic information can
serve as a powerful tool in the hands of those looking to discriminate and stigmatize
because, unlike standard medical information, it portrays individuals as inherently
different). Maryland's DNA collection statute provides an example of the ambiguity
concerning the use of DNA information for research. Ralph Brave, A More Reasonable
DNA Database,THE DAILY REC. (Baltimore), June 18, 2004.
34. Binny Miller, The Human Genome Project, DNA Science and the Law: The
American Legal System's Response to Breakthroughs in Genetic Science, 51 AM. U.L.
REV. 401, 416 (2001). See Porteus, supra note 4, at 1 (reporting on a Bush administration
proposal to expand federal DNA databases by requiring practically every individual
arrested to contribute DNA, and how this has "sparked debate between supporters who say
it will solve more cases and critics who insist it is too intrusive").
35. See Peppers, 817 N.E.2d at 1157-58 (admitting the court's "discomfort" with the
abandonment of the individualized suspicion requirement in DNA-testing cases and
asserting that "vigilance" is necessary to "ensure amorphous concepts of compelling state
interest do not subsume our dearly won right to privacy").

The John MarshallLaw Review

[39:115

or "sharply divided., 36 In fact, on August 18, 2004, the "bitterly divided"
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals actually reversed itself in an en banc
decision, after a three-judge panel declared that a law requiring federal
parolees to give blood samples for the FBI's DNA database violated 37the
Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable search and seizure.
Before overturning itself in the en banc decision, the Ninth Circuit
created a stir when, after nearly a decade of decisions upholding statutes
mandating DNA contribution from certain classes of felons, the court
rejected the validity of such statutes.38 Judge Reinhardt, who authored the
initial ruling, held that mandatory DNA extraction from a convict or parolee
was unconstitutional because it constituted a suspicionless search conducted
solely for law enforcement purposes. 39 Judge Reinhardt condemned court
approval of a "government's construction of a permanent governmental
database built from general suspicionless searches and designed for use in
the investigation and prosecution of criminal offenses. ' 4° Judge Reinhardt,
and those sharing his sentiment, continue to warn of the dangers inherent in
permitting the government to store such information about its citizens in a
centralized place and the risks associated with "having our DNA samples
permanently placed on file in federal cyberspace. 4 1
In a 6-5 reversal of the initial panel decision, the plurality in the en
banc opinion 42 realigned itself with prior judicial determinations declaring
the constitutionality of DNA databases. However, the Ninth Circuit's 112page divided opinion reinforces the serious ideological conflict within the
judiciary, and individual judges themselves, regarding the permissible scope
of governmental power over one's genetic code.43
36. Kravets, supra note 25, at 2. See Lisa Goldberg, Court, with reservations,Rules
DNA Databankis Constitutional;4-3 Margin, OpinionsShow Concerns About Collection,
THE BALT. SUN Co., Aug. 27, 2004, at 1B (reporting that "Maryland's DNA databank
survived a constitutional challenge in the state's highest court" by a small margin and "left

a majority of the judges troubled" by the consequences of "collecting genetic profiles");
Lawrence Hurley, FracturedMd. Court of Appeals Outlines why DNA Collection Act is
Constitutional,THE DAILY REC. (Baltimore), August 27, 2004 (reporting on a recent court
of appeals opinion upholding the Maryland DNA statute where the "seven-member court
was sharply divided, with three judges dissenting and three separate opinions from the

remaining four").
37. Kincade, 379 F.3d 839-40.
38. Kincade, 345 F.3d at 1113. See Mike McKee, Ninth CircuitScoffs at ForcedDNA
Testing, THE
RECORDER, October
2,
2003, No.3-2003,
available at
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id= 1065122109162
(describing
the controversy
sparked by the Kincade panel decision).
39. Kincade, 345 F.3d at 1113.
40. Kincade, 379 F.3d at 843.
41. Id.

42. The Kincade en banc decision held that paroled felons have only a limited right to
privacy and can be forced to give DNA samples even without a specific reason to suspect
they were involved, in or would be involved in, additional crimes. Id. at 834-35.
43. The Kincade decision went a step further than earlier cases upholding DNA
collection because it expanded the population subject to DNA collection to include
parolees, and it permitted a suspicionless search for purely law enforcement purposes.
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Often utilized in legal debate, 44 the slippery slope is merely a
theoretical metaphor; a simple image often applied in an abstract manner in
the civil liberties context. 45 The metaphor's overuse and superficial
application,4 6 however, have drained its argumentative potency.47 Although
the slippery slope argument has lost its bite, an in-depth look at the merits of
the metaphor may provide48a greater appreciation of what is at stake in the
race to fill DNA databases.
II. USING A SLIPPERY SLOPE METAPHOR TO EXAMINE JUDICIAL OUTCOMES
AND TO EXPOSE THE RISK OF A POPULATION-WIDE DNA DATABASE
The slippery slope metaphor describes all situations where one group's
support of a step A eventually makes it easier, due to logical, psychological,
or political forces, for others to implement a later step B. 49 This
phenomenon stems from certain societal truths; namely, the circumscribed
rationality that plagues decision makers - on every level - with limited time
to invest in political decision making, and the ways in which decision makers
compensate for this. 50 Thus, in a practical sense, slippery slopes pose a very
real risk where, "[i]n the absence of absolute knowledge and consequently
absolute control over the consequences of our actions and decisions, we
cannot afford to ignore the possible misuses of proposed reforms." 51 To lend
Some call the Kincade opinion a "pit stop on the path to approval of far broader DNA
collection." Ninth Circuit Upholds, supra note 6, at 822.
44. Slippery slope arguments can also play a role in judicial decision making. Eric
Lode, Comment, Slippery Slope Arguments and Legal Reasoning, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1469
(1999).
45. See Eugene Volokh & David Newman, In Defense of the Slippery Slope: Despite
the Metaphor's Poor Reputation, a Good Decision Now Can Lead to a Bad One Later,
LEGAL AFF. 21 (2003) (explaining how slippery slope arguments are usually applied and
responding to critics of the slippery slope metaphor).
46. Although critics point to simplistic assumptions underlying slippery slope
arguments, slippery slopes are closely related to complex, real-world phenomena like
"bounded rationality", "rational ignorance", and the rules of thumb that people develop to
compensate for their circumscribed rationality. Volokh, supra note 3, at 1035.
47. Even if its potency diminished with overuse, the slippery slope argument still plays
a worthy role in legal reasoning. Lode, supra note 44, at 1542.
48. Perhaps the ignorance of the basic mechanics or processes at work behind the
slippery slope theory explains the public's lack of interest and the judicial lack of
consistency when it comes to the very real danger of incremental loss of Fourth
Amendment rights.
49. Volokh, supra note 3, at 1029. See Mario J. Rizzo & Douglas Glen Whitman, The
Camel's Nose is in the Tent: Rules, Theories, and Slippery Slopes, 51 UCLA L. REV. 539,
545 (2003) (describing a slippery slope argument as, "if this, then that - with increased
likelihood").
50. See Volokh, supra note 3, at 1035 (explaining the close relationship between
slippery slopes and phenomena such as "bounded rationality, rational ignorance, heuristics
that people develop to deal with their bounded rationality, irrational choice behaviors...
and multi-peaked preferences," which are "common in the real world of voters, legislators,
and judges").
51. See id. at 1038 (quoting DAVID LAMB, DOWN THE SLIPPERY SLOPE: ARGUING IN
APPLIED ETHICS 120 (1988)); Richard Garlikov, The "Slippery Slope" Argument,
http://www.garlikov.com/philosophy/slope.htm (last visited Dec. 29, 2005) (explaining the
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more credibility to warnings such as this, and to the slippery slope metaphor
itself, Eugene Volokh, in his recent article Mechanisms of the Slippery
Slope,52 identifies a number of specific slippery slope mechanisms at work in
judicial decision making, as well as legislative and voter decision making.53
This Comment attempts to make a slippery slope argument in the context of
DNA database expansion by illustrating how these same mechanisms work
to push the nation further down a slippery slope leading to judicial
endorsement of a population-wide genetic database.54
A. Surveying the Slopes - The Framework of a Slippery Slope Argument
55
To clarify the analytical framework, a slippery slope argument
features several discernable characteristics, namely: (1) an original,
presumably acceptable argument and decision, (2) a "danger case," or the
advancement of a later argument and a corresponding decision deemed
clearly unacceptable, and (3) "mechanisms," or the means by which
acceptance of the original argument and the making of the original decision
increase the likelihood of acceptance of,and a decision representative of, the
"danger" case.56
In the context of a slippery slope argument against an all-inclusive
DNA database, one might identify the original acceptable argument as one
advocating extraction of DNA for inclusion in a DNA database only from
those convicted of heinous crimes, such as murder and rape. The original
decision(s), then, would validate such a database by finding that the
extraction of DNA and permanent storage of a DNA profile does not offend
Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable search and seizure. A
subsequent argument would take the first argument several steps further by
advocating the "danger case" - an all-inclusive, population-wide DNA
database. The "danger case" becomes reality when a court decides that
extracting DNA from the entire population for profiling and storage in a
database would similarly comport with the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment, This Comment focuses on what happens in between these two
scenarios - the theoretical, legal, psychological, and social forces, or

validity of slippery slope arguments in today's society where "rational explanations,
justifications, or arguments are [n]ever spelled out in their entirety" and how this
superficial reasoning permits important legal distinctions to go unmade).
52. See generally Volokh, supra note 3.
53. See generally id. (analyzing the political, social, and theoretical elements that
influence decision making).
54. See id. at 1127-28 (describing how one can estimate the "risk of slippage" by
identifying various slippery slope mechanisms and how this, in turn, helps us develop
some general "presumptions" to govern our actions and decisions regarding a certain
issue).
55. See Rizzo, supra note 49, at 546 (explaining that slippery slope arguments amount
to predictions made by observers "about how acceptance of some ideas - and resulting
actions - can lead to acceptance of other ideas - and resulting actions).
56. Id. at 544 (listing and describing the "key components" of a slippery slope
argument).
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"mechanisms," 57 that make acceptance of the first, seemingly tolerable,
proposal lead to implementation of a more offensive, not to mention
unconstitutional, "danger case."
B.

Why JudicialEndorsementof DNA DatabasesLends ltself to Slippery
Slope Analysis

Some legal issues prove more amenable to slippery slope arguments
than others.58 Slippery slope issues, then, share a number of common traits
indicating a risk of "slippage," such as: disagreement among decision
6
makers, 59 multiple theories advanced to support a common conclusion, 0
vagueness surrounding the accepted theories, 6' and the decision makers' use
of analogous reasoning. 62 Nonetheless, the judicial endorsement of law
enforcement's collection of genetic information lends itself well to slippery
slope analysis because it waives a number of the aforementioned "red flags."
For example, more often than not, court decisions addressing the
constitutionality of statutes authorizing law enforcement to take and store
DNA contain concurring and/or dissenting opinions. 63 Some judges concur
in the result, but advance a different theory to reach that result. 64 Others
dissent from the majority, finding that the practice does offend the Fourth
57. See id. at 544 (explaining that there exists many mechanisms or "processes"

linking the initial case and the danger case).
58. See id. at 574 (listing certain factors increasing the likelihood of slipping down a
slope, such as the "degree of disagreement among decisionmakers" and the "degree of
vagueness in the generally accepted theory").
59. Id.at 574-75
60. Id.
61. Id. at 574-76. See also Lode, supra note 44, at 1507 (discussing how "U]udges'

use of vague terms" can increase the likelihood of sliding down a slippery slope).
62. Rizzo, supra note 49 at 574-75.
63. See Goldberg, supra note 36 at IB (reporting on the "sharp division in opinion not
only in the result but in the basis for the result" when it comes to the constitutional
questions surrounding DNA databases).
64. Some judges find DNA extraction and database entry constitutional under the
"special needs" exception to the Fourth Amendment requirement of probable cause or
reasonable suspicion (which requires that the government intrusion serve a "special need"
beyond the normal needs of law enforcement). See Green, 354 F.3d at 678 (finding that
collecting and storing DNA serves a "special need" beyond the normal needs of law
enforcement because the primary purpose of the DNA law "is not to search for 'evidence'
of criminal wrongdoing" but is to "obtain reliable proof of a felon's identity"). Other
judges, conceding that the DNA statute(s) cannot qualify under the special needs exception
because it advances primarily law enforcement objectives, find such statutes constitutional
under the traditional Fourth Amendment balancing test (which assesses the reasonableness
of a search by balancing the degree of the government intrusion against an individual's
expectation of privacy against the government's legitimate interests). See Rise v. Oregon,
59 F.3d 1556, 1562 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the search satisfied Fourth Amendment
reasonableness after weighing a convict's substantially diminished expectation of privacy
and the minimal intrusiveness of the DNA extraction against the government's strong
interest in maintaining DNA data bases of convicted murderers and sex offenders). See
also Miles, 228 F. Supp. 2d at 1139 n.6 (declining to apply the special needs test,
asserting: "It is intellectually dishonest to decouple the collection of information ... from
the law enforcement purpose for which [the database] was created").
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65

Amendment.
Further, although all courts have ultimately upheld such
statutes, different courts and different circuits disagree on the proper
constitutional rationale.66 The substantial measure of disagreement and
inconsistency within and among the different courts increases the likelihood
of "slippage" towards the "danger case" because "decisionmakers looking
for an excuse to decide in a particular way are more likely to find a
justification when multiple (and potentially contradictory) justifications
exist., 67 So, the existence of multiple and potentially contradictory theories
creates a theoretical escape hatch - making it easier to legitimize the
inclusion of a larger class of individuals in DNA databases.
This phenomenon, coupled with the Supreme Court's historically
murky and "porous" ' 68 Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, further increases
65. See Raines, 857 A.2d at 63 n.13 (Bell, J., dissenting) (dissenting with two other
justices on the grounds that the majority's decision to uphold the DNA collection statute
was "reminiscent of a general warrant... authorizing a random or blanket search"); Rise,
59 F.3d at 1571 (Nelson, J., dissenting) (lamenting that the "majority has sacrificed a
precious constitutional protection in the name of greater police efficiency").
66. See Kincade, 379 F.3d at 842 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (asserting that, although
the majority approved the government's latest "effort to construct a comprehensive
national database... no majority exists with respect to the legal justification for this
conclusion").
We decline to choose between the special needs and balancing approaches. This is
an issue that remains in search of a principled analysis. Either way, the result is the
same. The statute survives a Fourth Amendment challenge. We simply observe
vigilance is required to ensure amorphous concepts of compelling state interest do
not subsume our dearly won right to privacy.
Peppers, 817 N.E.2d at 1158.
As Justice Theis wrote in a recent concurring opinion, "While these courts have uniformly
reached the same constitutional result, they contain no uniform analysis and frequently
include numerous dissents and concurrences." Ramos, 817 N.E.2d at 1130 (Theis, J.,
concurring). Another judge admitted that, although courts uphold DNA collection statutes
under the Constitution, "precedent is not consistent in the analysis used to justify this
conclusion." Miller v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 259 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1174 (D. Kan. 2003).
The Alaska Court of Appeals, in a recent decision upholding its DNA collection statute,
expressly declined to address the merits of possible future Fourth Amendment privacy
attacks against the statute. Nason, 102 P.3d at 963. After noting that "appellate courts in
this country are virtually unanimous" in finding the DNA collection statutes valid as
applied to identical factual situations, the court expressed great concern when it came to
the lack of a unanimous and precise constitutional basis for doing so. Id. at 964-65. The
court cited the Kincade en banc decision among other opinions to illustrate of the division
among and within the courts regarding the proper constitutional analysis of DNA
collection statutes. Id. The court viewed this as "no small problem, because each different
rationale for upholding DNA collection leads down a separate constitutional path in the
future litigation of related Fourth Amendment and privacy issues" and each justification
for DNA collection "holds the potential for government abuses and infringement on
citizen privacy." Id. at 965.
67. Rizzo, supra note 49, at 575. See Ronald J. Bacigal, Putting the People Back into
the Fourth Amendment, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 359, 396 (1994) (describing how courts
allow themselves "alternative expressions of a single determination" when it comes to
Fourth Amendment analyses); Ninth Circuit Upholds, supra note 6, at 823 (attributing the
expansion of DNA collection to the growing number of permissible rationales for
suspicionless searches available to judges).
68. D.H. Kaye & Michael E. Smith, DNA Identification Databases: Legality,
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the risk of "slippage" towards a more expansive DNA database.
Accordingly, inconsistency and ambiguity abound within two legal theories
used to justify the government's DNA harvesting in the name of crime
control under the Fourth Amendment. 69 One can classify the main theories
advanced by the courts, the "special needs" doctrine and the "totality of the
circumstances" balancing test, as inherently imprecise.70
These two
approaches are the product of what scholars refer to as the Fourth
Amendment's "interpretive mess," where "each doctrine is more duct tape
on the Amendment's frame and a step closer to the junkyard.'
For example, many claim that "special needs" beyond the normal needs
of law enforcement means whatever the government wants it to mean,72
which will quickly work to extinguish any fundamental right to privacy
enjoyed by average citizens. Others characterize the Fourth Amendment
"totality of the circumstances" balancing approach (used by many courts to
collection from convicts) as a "malleable and boundless
justify DNA
73
standard."
Legitimacy, and the Case For Population-Wide Coverage, 2003 Wis. L. REv. 413, 437
(2003). See also Kathryn R. Urbonya, A Fourth Amendment "Search " in the Age of
Technology: Postmodern Perspectives, 72 MISS. L.J. 447, 448 (2002) (observing that
search and seizure decisions feature "multiple, conflicting interpretive paths," especially
when it comes to use of technology in government investigations).
69. In Jones v. Murray, the court upheld a statute requiring all felons (including nonviolent felons) to contribute to a DNA database for administrative convenience, rather than
to further law enforcement. A dissenting judge said that the case lead him to a "deep,
disturbing, and overriding concern that, without a proper and compelling justification, the
Commonwealth may be successful in taking significant strides toward establishment of a
future police state, in which broad and vague concerns for administrative efficiency will
serve to support substantial intrusions into the privacy of citizens." Jones v. Murray, 962
F.2d 302, 315 (4th Cir. 1992) (Murnaghan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
70. See e.g., Nicholas v. Goord, No. 01 Civ. 7891, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11708, at
*16 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (noting that, although the court considers a number of factors, the
Fourth Amendment balancing test used to assess the reasonableness of a government
search is "incapable of precise definition or application"); State v. Olivas, 856 P.2d 1076,
1090 (Wash. 1993) (Utter, J., concurring) (noting that the rationale for the "special needs"
doctrine has not been fully explained by the Supreme Court); Puri, supra note 22, at 9
(noting that "[v]ague phrases such as 'law enforcement purposes' allow for a very
expansive interpretation or a very narrow one); Donald R.C. Pongrace, A Symposium of
Critical Legal Study: Stereotypification of the Fourth Amendment's Public/Private
Distinction: An Opportunity for Clarity, 34 AM. U.L. REv. 1191, 1192, 1198 (1985)
(asserting that "both the rhetoric and substance" of Fourth Amendment doctrine illustrates
its "inherent manipulability").
71. Urbonya, supra note 68, at 447; Erik G. Luna, Sovereignty and Suspicion, 48
DUKE L. J.787, 787-88 (1999).
72, See Honorable Ronald M. Gould & Simon Stern, Catastrophic Threats and the
Fourth Amendment, 77 S. CAL. L. REv. 777, 815 (2004) (explaining that the "contours of
the special-needs doctrine are still being defined," making its application and development
difficult to predict). One scholar referred to the "special needs" test as the "ill-defined
doctrine" invoked by many courts to uphold database statutes. Kaye, supra note 32, at
200.
73. Kincade, 379 F.3d at 860 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). The traditional Fourth
Amendment balancing approach has also been characterized as a "nebulous" balancing act
performed without a meaningful articulation of actual valuation standards, or "degrees of
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The use of analogy as a decision-making tool represents another
slippery slope factor. For example, nearly every court justifies its outcome,
in part, by comparing DNA extraction and database entry to employee drug
testing," or, more often, the police practice of fingerprinting." Drawing on
such comparisons to justify application of an existing theory to a new set of
facts increases the likelihood of slippage from a decision validating DNA
databases including only felons, to a decision validating a population-wide
database. 76 This is because a judge who reasons by analogy can conceal
inconsistencies in the theoretical backdrop. 7
For example, although courts continue to view regular fingerprints and
"DNA fingerprints" as analogous because they both serve as identification
markers, they differ in many ways. For instance, the usefulness of analyzing
one's fingerprints begins and ends with their function as identifiers. A look
into DNA, on the other hand, reveals a person's physiological memoirs.
Although courts continue to accept law enforcement's defense of the
fingerprint analogy, which claims that they store only "junk DNA" that uses
identifiers containing no indication of genetic traits, this defense is losing
validity among scientists.78 Once considered a "genetic wasteland," the

'importance."' Bacigal, supra note 67, at 402. See Ninth Circuit Upholds, supra note 6, at
824 (noting that unlike the more restrictive special needs rationale, the totality of the
circumstances analysis is "mushy" and "unconstrained by Fourth Amendment precedent,"
leaving courts free to adopt a sprawling rationale that might apply to anyone classified as
having a reduced expectation of privacy). See also Sally E. Renskers, Comment, Trial by
Certainty; Implications of Genetic "DNA Fingerprints",39 EMORY L.J. 309, 324, 328
(1990) (noting that increased application of balancing tests to Fourth Amendment rights
spells danger for individual privacy interests and broadens the scope of permissible
government intrusions); Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of
Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 976 (1987) (stating that the balancing test "takes place
inside a black box").
74. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (upholding
suspicionless drug testing of railroad employees and deeming the drug test a "minimal
intrusion").
75. See Ramos, 817 N.E.2d at 1122-23 (explaining that DNA has been likened to
fingerprints because, despite some differences, they both serve as identity markers);
Colorado v. Shreck, 107 P.3d 1048, 1053 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004) (noting that other cases
have recognized DNA samples as analogous to fingerprints in that they function as generic
identification tools).
76. See Rizzo, supra note 49, at 575 (explaining why reasoning through analogy
exacerbates the probability of slippage because "[fWor any characteristic a of an
established case, there is a greater chance it will be found similar to another characteristic
b of a newly arisen case")(emphasis added).
77. In other words, "statements of similarity may be made without recognition of their
conflicting bases." Thus, "'like cases will be treated alike' may not be truly alike
according to a consistent principle or theory." Id.
78. See Bill Hughes and Richard Liebson, High-Tech DNA Raises Questions, THE J.
NEWS, Apr. 2, 2004, available at http://www.thejournalnews.conm/newsroom/040204/
ao02dnaside.html (reporting that "junk DNA" is becoming more revealing every year as
scientists discover more and more genetic markers). Also, many states preserve the
original tissue or blood samples indefinitely. Consequently, when technology eventually
reveals more about the human genome and "junk DNA," the samples will likely be used
for additional purposes.
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information contained in so-called "junk DNA" becomes more and more
year and may well turn out to be "the very basis of human
revealing every
79
complexity.

Through equating DNA collection statutes to the commonly accepted
practice of fingerprinting, judges can simplify the constitutional analysis and
conceal any theoretical "gaps" in their justifications. Judge Nelson's
dissenting opinion in Rise v. Oregon,80 poignantly points out how courts'
reasoning by analogy tends to over-simplify justifications advanced for DNA
databases:
Relying on the glib linguistic ease with which various commentators
categorize DNA genetic pattern analysis as a kind of genetic "fingerprinting,"
the majority simply asserts that the purpose of identifying future criminal
to equate a forced blood
perpetrators makes it possible constitutionally
81
fingerprinting.
forced
a
with
extraction

Thus, by reasoning through analogy, courts gloss over the crucial
differences between fingerprints and DNA, which warrants a separate and
more thoughtful legal analysis.82
Additionally, courts often analogize a class of people characterized as
violent felons with other classes of people such as: non-violent felons,
83
prisoners in general, parolees, and felons whose terms have expired.
Apparently, these individuals all share a reduced expectation of privacy that
allows the government to keep their DNA on file, yet states are now adding
misdemeanants, juveniles, 8 4 and arrestees 85 to this list. Consequently, the
number of people now experiencing a reduced expectation of privacy is
79. See Clive Cookson, Regulatory Genes Found in 'Junk DNA', FIN. TIMES
(reporting that biologists are now finding that parts of the
genome previously "dismissed as a genetic wasteland" actually carry out essential
functions); W. Wayt Gibbs, The Unseen Genome: Gems Among the Junk, Scl. AM., Nov.
http://www.mindfully.org/GE/2003/Junk-GenomeNov03.htm.;
available at
2003,
(discussing new scientific evidence revealing the unique and important functions of what
was once "damned as junk because it was not understood..."); Jill C. Schaefer,
Comment, Profilingat the Cellular Level, 14 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 559, 577-78 (2004)
(asserting that scientists have already confirmed the presence of markers showing an
individual's susceptibility to type-one diabetes in "junk DNA"). See generally, John
Cook, Junk May Hold the Key to the Genome Puzzle, THE SEATTLE POST INTELLIGENCER,
Oct. 10, 2003, at D1 (discussing recent scientific endeavors to uncover "valuable pieces of
genetic material" buried in what was once thought of as junk DNA).
80. See 59 F.3d 1556, 1564-70 (9th Cir. 1995) (arguing that the majority's analysis
fails to recognize the "critical constitutional distinction between coerced fingerprinting and
blood extraction for DNA genetic pattern analysis").
81. Id. at 1569.
82. See infra Part II. C. 1. (describing fingerprint analogy in the context of judicial
extensions of precedent).
83. Green, 354 F.3d at 679 (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
84. Schaefer, supra note 79, at 578.
85. For example, in 2003 the state of Louisiana went from collecting DNA from
anyone convicted of a felony or certain misdemeanors, to a law that now takes DNA from
mere arrestees for inclusion in the state and the national database. Josh Noel, La. Leader
in Databaseof DNA; Collection Laws Most Liberal in U.S., THE ADVOC. (Baton Rouge),
Dec. 4, 2004, at I-B.
(LONDON), June 4, 2004, at 11
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increasing exponentially. Most courts avoid articulating the degrees of
privacy expectation required to hold on to one's DNA, but at least one judge
points out the need for some differentiation.
According to Judge
Easterbrook, "Courts that have dealt with constitutional challenges to DNAcollection statutes frequently have lumped together all persons subject to
these laws. Yet there are... categories potentially subject to differing legal
analysis. 8 6 This represents yet another analytical shortcut often taken in the
judicial justifications of DNA databases. Such shortcuts, however, work
only to expedite the trip to the bottom of the slope.
C. Bunny Hills and Black Diamonds- The Types of Slippery Slopes
Driving DNA DatabaseExpansion
Although many complex forces yield the required momentum for
sliding the acceptable initial proposal down to the unacceptable "danger
case," scholars such as Eugene Volokh have identified some specific
slippery slopes. 7 This Comment focuses on several types of slippery slopes
most applicable to DNA database expansion: (1) judicial extension of
precedent; 88 (2) cost-lowering; 89 (3) attitude-altering; 90 and (4) small change
tolerance. 91 Evaluating these slopes will help to reveal the theoretical
journey from an original proposal/decision (forcing sex offenders and
murderers to contribute to a DNA database used for tracking and crime
solving) to a "danger case" proposal/decision (forcing every citizen to
contribute to a DNA database used for law enforcement and non-law
enforcement purposes).
1.

Extension of Precedent

The Fourth Amendment guarantees: "the right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no [w]arrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause .... ,92
Although this amendment contains a reasonableness clause and a
warrant clause, modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has merged these
two clauses by permitting certain government searches conducted without a
warrant or probable cause on a finding that a particular search is
reasonable.93 The court assesses the reasonableness of a search using a
"totality of the circumstances" analysis where it balances the government
86. Green, 354 F.3d at 679 (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
87. See generally Volokh, supra note 3 (analyzing several different types of slippery
slopes).
88. Id. at 1064.
89. Id. at 1039-50.
90. Id. at 1077-104.
91. Id. at 1105-15.
92. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
93. See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 122 (2001) (upholding a warrantless

search of a probationer's home finding it was reasonable in light of the government's
strong interest in rehabilitating probationers and protecting society from future criminal
violations and the probationer's diminished expectation of privacy).
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interest against the individual's expectation of privacy.94 The Supreme
Court has also created express exceptions to the warrant and probable cause
requirement, including the "special needs" doctrine that permits government
intrusions serving special needs beyond the normal needs of law enforcement
when the special needs outweigh the intrusion on individual privacy rights.
Despite the lack of any consensus, courts have recently managed to stretch
both of these Fourth Amendment analyses ("totality of the circumstances"
and "special needs") to cover the DNA collection statutes.95 The extension
of precedent slippery slope analysis reveals how the practice of treating like
cases alike can somehow lead to the invalid or "undesirable conclusion that
unlike cases should be treated alike. 96
For example, when weighing the government interest in collecting
DNA from felons for storage in the database, nearly every court places great
emphasis on the finding that DNA testing constitutes a "minimal intrusion."
In justifying this characterization courts often cite Skinner v. Ry. Labor
Executive Ass'n, where the Supreme Court held that the collection and
analysis of urine samples from railroad employees constituted a search, but
amounted to only a minimal intrusion. 97 But, "unlike a test for drugs and
alcohol - a measurement of a concentration that exists at a particularpoint
in time - DNA analysis maps immutable, lifelong characteristics of an
individual. 98 Furthermore, in the urine collection at issue in Skinner, the
analysis performed revealed information describing only the particular
employee donor (whether they were intoxicated or not), whereas DNA
analysis provides information regarding a donor's genome and "reveals the
private concerns of the donor's parents, children, and siblings." 99
94. Id. Whether a search is reasonable "depends on all of the circumstances
surrounding the search or seizure and the nature of the search or seizure itself," and the
propriety of a search is "judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth
Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests." Skinner,
489 U.S. at 619.
95. However, not all the comers are fitting and according to Judge Reinhardt, "Neither
Supreme Court precedent nor any established rule of Fourth Amendment law" supports
programmatic searches used to detect evidence of "ordinary criminal wrongdoing" absent
individualized suspicion. Kincade, 379 F.3d at 843 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
96. See Rizzo, supra note 49, at 558 (describing how, in systems where precedent
controls the decision-making process, a "series of logical steps can link highly disparate
cases" if the cases being decided are "distributed along a spectrum according to some
relevant factor").
97. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 625. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 760-70
(1966) (finding that a blood test represented only a minimal intrusion and that it was
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment to force a drunk driver to give blood at the
emergency room). However, in Schmerber, unlike the DNA cases, there was probable
cause to suspect that the arrestee committed a crime and the police sought direct evidence
of that crime in taking the blood. Id. The court even recognized that, "the interests in
human dignity and privacy which the Fourth Amendment protects forbid any such
intrusions on the mere chance desired evidence might be obtained."
98. Robert Craig Scherer, Note, Mandatory Genetic Dogtags and the Fourth
Amendment: The Needfor a New Post-Skinner Test, 85 GEO. L.J. 2007, 2021 (1997).
99. Id. at 2021. See Recent Case, Icelandic Supreme Court Holds That Inclusion of an
Individual's Genetic Information in a National DatabaseInfringes on the Privacy Interests
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Additionally, in Skinner, the search ended after the initial focused and
immediate chemical analysis. With DNA extraction, however, "the 4th
Amendment intrusion [] is not primarily the taking of blood, but seizure of
the DNA fingerprint and its inclusion in a searchable database."'0 0 So, by
citing Skinner as precedent for the minimal intrusion occasioned by DNA
extraction and database entry, courts make it easier to find such a search
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, whether performed on felons or
normal citizens.' 0 ' One court even admitted to feeling "discomfort with the
seeming abandonment of... individualized suspicion" in the DNA cases,
but was consoled by pointing to the drug testing in Skinner and observing
°
102
that "there is nothing new about it."
Courts also engage in extending precedent when they cite United States
v.Knights, 0 3 to support a decision permitting law enforcement searches in
the absence of individualized suspicion. The Knights court, applying the
"totality of the circumstances" balancing test, found the warrantless search of
a probationer's home reasonable. °4 However, in Knights, the search was
supported by reasonable suspicion and was specifically authorized by a
condition of his probation.'0 5 In fact, the Knights court made a point of
saying, "we need not address the constitutionality of a suspicionless search
06
because the search in this case was supported by reasonable suspicion."'
Nonetheless, courts use the holding in Knights to justify DNA searches,
which, on the other hand, involve no modicum of reasonable suspicion that
the individual has committed a specific crime. Courts dodge this distinction
by focusing their justification on the similarities, e.g., probationers, felons,
and all those convicted of a crime share diminished expectations of privacy,
and the government holds a "monumental"' 1 7 interest in preventing
recidivism, 0 8 and reducing crime. Inlight of this, it comes as no surprise
when the balancing test in the DNA cases yields the same result as the
Knights case - a reasonable search.

ofHis Child, Guomundsdottir v. Iceland, No. 151/2003 (Nov. 27, 2003) (Ice.), 118 HARV.
L. REv. 810, 810-811 (2004) (discussing the Icelandic Supreme Court's holding that
relatives of an individual whose genetic information is included in a national database
possess a legally cognizable privacy interest in the related individual's information).
100. Kincade, 379 F.3d at 873 (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting).
101. See Rothstein & Carnahan, supra note 21, at 142 (recognizing that if courts
balance only the minimal intrusiveness of the physical blood extraction against the
governmental interest, then further expansion of DNA testing for law enforcement will
surely be upheld).
102. Peppers, 817 N.E.2d at 1157.

103. 534 U.S. 112 (2001).
104. Id. at 122.
105. Id.
106. Id.at 120 n.6.
107. Kincade, 379 F.3d at 865 (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting).
108. Whether courts upholding DNA database statutes focus their justifications on a
diminished expectation of privacy or the "special needs" exception, all of them rely to
some degree on recidivism rates. Consequently, as DNA databases continue to expand to

include "all convicted offenders, non-convicted arrestees, or everyone at birth, critics have
and will become more dubious of the recidivism argument." Pur, supra note 22, at 8.
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Judge Reinhardt justifiably fears that using the Knights case as
precedent starts courts down a "dangerous path"' °9 because it results in
application of the "totality of the circumstances" approach simply because
probationers have reduced expectations of privacy. 110 In his dissenting
opinion, Judge Reinhardt identifies some of the "countless groups of
individuals" also legally recognized as holding reduced expectations of
privacy."' Through the extension of Knights and the failure to draw any
clear lines when it comes to privacy expectations, courts have created a huge
potential for slippage. The "totality of the circumstances" approach used in
the DNA cases, stripped down to a balancing of interests" - consistently
situating a feather-light expectation of privacy opposite an elephant of a
government interest - will undoubtedly apply
again when courts review the
13
inclusion of arrestees in DNA databases.'
Courts upholding DNA collection statutes under the "special needs"
doctrine also extend Supreme Court precedent. Two recent Supreme Court
cases, City of Indianapolis v. Edmond'1 4 and Ferguson v. City of

109. Kineade, 379 F.3d at 863-64 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
110. See id. at 843 n. 1 (observing that the majority opinion adopts a "sweeping totality

of the circumstances test" with the effect of "blatantly eviscerating" the Fourth
Amendment requirement of reasonable suspicion for government searches).
111. Id. at864.
112. According to Charles Black, "as a matter of attitude, the language of 'balancing' is
apt language, easily conformable language, for the job of cutting down to what somebody
thinks is comfortable size the claims to a sometimes awkward human freedom which the
Bill of Rights set out to protect." See Oren Gross, Are Torture Warrants Warranted?
PragmaticAbsolutism and Official Disobedience, 88 MINN. L. REv. 1481, 1507 (2004)
(quoting Charles L. Black, Jr., Mr. Justice Black, the Supreme Court, and the Bill of
Rights, HARPER'S MAG. 63, 66 (Feb. 1961), reprinted in CHARLES BLACK, THE
OCCASIONS OF JUSTICE: ESSAYS MOSTLY ON LAW 89-102 (1963) to support the assertion
that "it is easier to justify the use of torture when engaging in 'balancing').
113. Kincade, 379 F.3d at 864 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). See Illinois v. Edwards, 818
N.E.2d 814, 818 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (recognizing that dissenting judges have questioned
application of the totality of the circumstances test to suspicionless searches because "this
proposition puts numerous citizens, including, inter alia, people attending public schools
or driving or riding in motor vehicles, at risk of warrantless searches," and also because of
doubts regarding whether an individual's privacy interests could ever outweigh the
government's interest under the test); Dolan & Blankstein, supra note 2, at B 1 (reporting
on the 9th Circuit's decision in Kincade and how its application of Fourth Amendment
precedent "establishes the legal groundwork for the government to take DNA samples of
the general population"); Kravets, supra note 25, at 2 (reporting on the 9th Circuit's

decision in Kincade and Judge Reinhardt's observation that the rationale used to uphold
the law requiring parolees to submit DNA for the national database could also be
employed to allow the government to "bypass the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against
unreasonable searches and demand that everyone give a blood sample to the authorities");
McAree, supra note 24, at 4 (quoting Cook County States Attorney John Gormon who
notes that "[y]our reasonable expectation of privacy diminishes the moment you are
arrested").
114. See generally City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000) (holding that an

automobile checkpoint program involving dog sniffs around the perimeter of the car did
not qualify as a legitimate special governmental need but rather a pretext for detecting
evidence of criminal wrongdoing).
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Charleston,115 make it clear that the "special needs" exception to the rule that
searches must be based on some modicum of individualized suspicion only
applies when the government shows a special need "divorced" from its
general interest in law enforcement.1 1 6 If the court finds such a special need,
it then weighs the severity of the intrusion and the individual's privacy
interest against the government's articulated special need(s). 17 Thus, courts
applying the "special needs" analysis to DNA cases distinguish law
enforcement's efforts to build a DNA database from the general efforts of
law enforcement to gather evidence of criminal wrongdoing. 1 8 They
identify the purpose of the statutes as furthering several "special needs," such
as identification of criminals, deterrence of recidivism, and solving crimes.' 19
A number of judges, however, "prefer to be more honest about the
matter" by pointing out that DNA databases are clearly designed for
providing evidence of criminality.' 20 One court, declining to apply the
"special needs" doctrine to a DNA collection statute, called it "intellectually
dishonest to decouple the collection of information... from the law
enforcement purpose for which the database was created."' 12 1 Nonetheless,
recent court decisions continue to cite "special needs" precedent to legitimize
DNA databases. In Griffin v. Wisconsin, 122 for example, the Supreme Court
upheld the warrantless search of a probationer's home justified by existence
of "reasonable grounds" for a probation officer to believe that a search would
uncover contraband. The Griffin court held that the state's operation of a
probation program qualified as a "special need.' 23 However,
as
Judge
Reinhardt pointed out, although Griffin dealt with probationers, "the
similarities end there."' 1 4 In Griffin, the search regime was designed to
facilitate the supervision of probationers during the limited term of
probation. 12 5 The DNA statutes, on the other hand, are designed to monitor
115. See generally Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001) (holding that a
hospital policy of testing pregnant women for drugs and giving over positive results to
prosecutors was clearly to generate evidence to assist in prosecution).
116. Id. at 79;Edmond, 531 U.S. at37.
117. Illinois v. Hall, 816 N.E.2d 703, 712 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2004).
118. United States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132, 1146 (10th Cir. 2003); Hall, 816 N.E.2d at
712.
119. See Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 1999) (applying the "special needs"
doctrine and citing law enforcement's special need in deterring and solving crimes). See
generally Olivas, 856 P.2d at 1076 (applying the "special needs" doctrine and emphasizing
the special needs of deterring recidivism).
120. Raines, 857 A.2d at 49. See Velasquez, 329 F.3d at 1176 (asserting that "there is
no question" that the primary purpose of the DNA collection statutes was one of law
enforcement given that its primary goal was to help solve past and future crimes); Kaye,
supra note, 32 at 203 (arguing that, contrary to what some courts hold, the motive behind
the DNA database legislation has not been to replace fingerprints as identity markers but
"has always been to generate investigative leads").
121. Nicholas, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11708, at *15 (quoting United States v. Miles,
228 F. Supp. 2d 1130, n.6 (E.D. Cal. 2002)).
122. 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
123. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 870-75.
124. Kincade, 379 F.3d at 857 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
125. Id.
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individuals for a period of time extending far beyond a conditional release's
period of supervision' 26 (i.e., for the rest of their lives), "even if all their civil
rights are legally restored.', 127 Moreover, courts using the "special needs"
analysis conveniently avoid addressing the legitimacy of a "special need" to
identify, monitor, supervise, and deter from recidivism an individual who
committed a felony by "defacing" a government building when they were
eighteen for the rest of their lives and beyond. 2 Further, unlike Griffin, the
forced extraction of blood mandated by state and federal DNA collection
statutes is clearly not designed to rehabilitate probationers, but rather to
promote the construction of a national DNA database to aid law enforcement
in solving past and future crimes. 129 Yet again, judges attempt to stretch the
Supreme Court precedent to fit the contours of suspicionless DNA searches
and DNA databases. In light of this, it seems that nothing stands in the way
of a court's stretching the "special needs" precedent to cover arrestees130 and,
eventually, an all-inclusive DNA database.
After all, isn't ensuring a safer,
31
more secure society a "special need?'
Through an extension of existing Fourth Amendment precedent to
justify the initial decision (databases storing the DNA of convicted violent
felons), courts have actually set a new precedent based on new justifications
32
that lower courts, and even coordinate courts, will feel bound to apply.

126. Id, See also Jim Edwards, NJ,s 'Weedman' Takes on DNA Sampling Law: All
Convicted Criminals Must Give Samples, NAT'L L. J., November 17, 2003, Vol. 26, No.
12, Pg. 5 (reporting that sheriffs' departments and intensive supervision programs officials
are "[gearing] up to take cheek swabs from people who thought they'd paid their debt to
society").
127. See THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY BLOG, New Post at the Volokh Conspiracy, Aug.
18, 2004, http://www.mail-archive.com/volokh@lists.powerblogs.com/msg00828.html
(last visited Dec. 29, 2005) (discussing the Kincade opinion and Judge Kozinski's concern
with the government's permanent rentention of a parolee's DNA information).
128, In his dissenting opinion, Judge Reinhardt provides an updated list of crimes that
subject an individual to permanent inclusion in the national DNA database, which includes
offenses such as tearing a one-dollar bill in half, or interfering with a mailman in the
course of his duties. Kincade, 379 F.3d at 846-47 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 857-58.
130. See Kaye, supra note 4 at 498 (analyzing the special needs line of cases and
concluding that "the outcomes of but-for tests and mixed-motive inquiries ... and there is
room for states intent on including arrestees in their DNA databases to engage in strategic
manipulation"); Legal Evolution, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec. 1, 2003, available at
http://www.sptimes.com/2003/12/01/OpinionlLegal-evolution.shtml
("If the FBI can
maintain DNA profiles on arrestees, then why not on all Americans?").
131. See John P. Cronan, The Next Frontier of Law Enforcement: A Proposalfor
Complete DNA Databanks, 28 AM. J. CRIM. L. 119, 156 (2000) (asserting that DNA

databases serve "special needs" such as making society safer). See generally Quarmby,
supra note 19, 24-25 (advocating a population-wide DNA database and asserting that a
safer society is a "special need"). Some argue that after September 1 th, a "present need
for foolproof identification and the increased level of national security it entails, would no
doubt qualify as [a special need] too." Id. at 25.
132. Volokh, supra note 3, at 1065-66. See United States v. Meier, No. CR97-72HA,
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25755 (D. Or. 2002) ("While the DNA Act covers a wider
category of criminals, there is no reason to depart from the result in Rise.").
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Because this new precedent embodies vague.33 and flexible justifications,
lower courts can effortlessly stretch it to cover future proposals to expand
134
databases to include arrestees, and eventually the entire population.
Needless to say, courts have successfully used precedent as a ski lift,
dropping us on the crest of the slope.
2.

Cost-lowering

Another slippery slope arises when a first decision upholds a proposal
that lowers the costs of enacting a second proposal, which helps justify
upholding the second proposal in the eyes of the decision makers. 35 The
cost-lowering slippery slope refers not only to quantifiable dollar savings,
but also administrative, legal, and political considerations. To illustrate,
judicial endorsement of law enforcement's extraction and storage of DNA
from convicted felons distributes more power to law enforcement; making
arrests, prosecutions, and crime-control easier; increasing the amount of
information accessible to the government,136 making it easier to identify and
locate people; and providing law enforcement and forensic labs with more
experience, making expansion of the databases seem less risky and more
acceptable to the public, etc.
More specifically, judicial decisions upholding DNA databases for
convicted felons in order to help deter and solve crime will effectively lower
the cost of expanding the databases to cover arrestees, and then the entire
population. Although opponents argue that expanding the databases is too
expensive, others point out that the increased efficiency in crime solving
would offset these additional costs. 137 As the judicial justifications for
including felons have already indicated, "DNA Database and Data Bank
laws facilitate identification, prosecution, and exoneration of suspects...."
Consequently, money spent on database expansion is viewed as an
investment. For example, it will decrease the delay between issuing the

133. See Ninth Circuit Upholds, supra note 6, at 824 n.52 (noting that, although a
number of courts have upheld the DNA Act under a totality of the circumstances test,
many of the opinions feature a "cursory or vague" legal analysis).
134. According to Judge Kozinski: "If collecting DNA fingerprints can be justified on
the basis of the plurality's multifactor, gestalt high-wire act, then it's hard to see how we
can keep the database from expanding to include everybody." Kincade, 379 F.3d at 872
(Kozinski J., dissenting). See Ninth Circuit Upholds, supra note 6, at 818 (explaining that
the Kincade majority's use of a broad reasonableness standard to justify subjecting
parolees to DNA database inclusion "opened a window" that the Supreme Court might
close in order to protect Fourth Amendment rights of those never convicted of a felony).
135. Volokh, supra note 3, at 1041.
136. See Mark G. Young, Note, What Big Eyes and Ears You Have!.: A New Regime
For Covert Governmental Surveillance, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1017, 1023 (2001)

(discussing the "allure of... crime-fighting" technologies and how it is "predictably and
justifiably very strong" given that "'information is power'... [i]n the context of criminal
prosecutions").
137. "Although expanding the DNA Data Base is expensive, the additional cost will
likely result in a greater ability of investigators to solve crimes" because it would
"facilitate identification, prosecution, and exoneration of suspects.. .saving on Federal,
State and Local funds expended in resolving those cases." Manuel, supra note 8, at 363.
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arrest warrant and the prosecution of a crime for individuals whose
information has already been stored and eventually decrease the number of
cases that go to trial and the duration of trials. 38 Under this efficiency
argument, expansion seems both economically sound and socially desirable,
making a proposal to include arrestees seem more legitimate to decision
makers.
Further, in response to recent judicial endorsements of criminal DNA
databases, legislators are approving bills allocating huge sums of money to
help improve the federal and state databases. 139 The funds will not only help
the federal and state governments to clear up DNA backlogs, 40 but will
provide better tools to analyze old DNA evidence and to collect more DNA
samples from possible offenders. This, in turn, will gradually reduce
operational burdens and lessen the fiscal and political impact of a decision to
expand the databases. In other words, the infrastructure is already in place,
the national CODIS database holds over 1.6 million profiles, and funds have
already been allocated for improvement and future elaboration.' 4' The result
is that decision-makers will have even fewer justifications for not deciding in
favor of proposals to expand databases to include arrestees. Critics of
expansion proposals assert that the "likely reach of an arrest-based database
should give pause to anyone hoping to limit database coverage to a small
fraction of the population."'' 42 They accurately note that "[i]nclusion in a
DNA identification database of half or more of the male population and
nearly all African American men is an odd result for a policy intended to
limit government's control of samples and profiles of our DNA .... 99143 So,
the population's arrest rate 144 practically dispenses a major argument

138. Schaefer, supra note 79, at 574.
139. "The White House is pushing to make DNA a more effective law enforcement
tool. Last month, it announced a plan to spend about $1 billion over five years to improve
the national database." Willing, supra note 30, at 1. See Porteus, supra note 4 at 1
(reporting that a justice department funding proposal would allocate at least one billion
dollars over the next five years, towards enhancing DNA databases on all levels of the
criminal justice system).
140. DNA 's Double Standard, supra note 18, at 1 (reporting that over the next five
years the Bush administration intends to spend $800 million in upgrading DNA analysis
systems to identify suspects in old unsolved crimes).
141. See James Herbie DiFonzo, In Praise of Statutes of Limitations in Sex Offense
Cases, 41 HOUs. L. REV. 1205, 1240 (2004) (noting the Bush Administration's proposed
allocation of one billion dollars to improve the national DNA database and to train law
enforcement personnel in DNA use).
142. Kaye & Smith, supra note 24, at 458.
143. Id.
144. Today "American police enjoy unprecedented power to arrest" and, therefore,
search individuals for a whole host of minor offenses under local, state and federal laws.
Wayne A. Logan, The Court Affords Police ConstitutionalCarte Blanche, 77 IND. L.J.
419, 436 (2002). For example, after Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, Texas, where police
arrested a soccer mom for a seat belt violation, police can now arrest an individual on the
spot if there is probable cause that a very minor offense was committed. Id. at 419-20.
Further, legislative and judicial officials seem to openly acknowledge the government's
efforts to utilize these low-level offenses to serve greater law enforcement ends. Id. at
466. It is feared, however, that this "unfettered authority" to arrest not only strips the
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advanced in opposition of an all inclusive database: "that it is financially and
logistically 45feasible to sample DNA on arrest, but not feasible to sample
everyone."1
So, although decision-makers play a more passive role in creation of
the cost-lowering slippery slope than in a precedent-extension slippery slope,
it is a natural effect of the initial decision that makes a later decision, the
"danger case," easier to justify.
The courts play the more inactive role of ignoring the ways in which
judicial justifications change 46people's perceptions by "defining as benefits
what we once deemed costs.'
3.

Attitude-Altering

According to scholar Eugene Volokh, the attitude-altering slippery
slope occurs "when the expressive power of law changes people's political
behavior as well as their own behavior, by leading them to accept proposals
that they would have rejected before.' 47 Although the attitude-altering
slippery slope seems more applicable to the average voter, in many ways
judges face the same decisions and fall subject to the same external
influences. Today, judges juggle substantial case loads and enjoy little more
time to devote to researching a political issue than the average citizen. For
this reason, all decision-makers, voters and judges alike, operate under a
limited scope of rationality.148 Consequently, decision-makers tend to defer
to the existing state of the law and its well-researched and well-grounded
49
justifications to guide their factual decisions on future proposals. 1
The attitude-altering slippery slope, then, describes how the initial
decision, and similar decisions, gradually changes the public's mind to make
it more accepting of a later decision representing the "danger case."
Fourth Amendment of its reasonableness requirement, leaving the privacy and liberty it
guarantees to citizens by the wayside, but also grants police even greater discretion and
capacity to carry out discriminatory motives in enforcing the laws. Id. at 422, 466.
145. Kaye & Smith, supra note 24, at 458.

146. Scholar Laurence Tribe discusses the effects of judicial decisions on perceptions of
cost:

[T]he Court, to the extent we heed its voice or allow it to speak for us, reorders our
constitutional priorities and reshapes who we are - a people more interested in
punishment of private wrongdoers than in security against unlawful intrusions by
public officials, and a society in which we would rather deceive ourselves than
confront life's, and the Constitution's, sometimes tragic choices. Yet the Court's

calculus, like any comparative calculation of costs and benefits, blithely ignores the
way in which the decision at hand itself transforms us all by defining as benefits
what we once deemed costs.
Laurence H. Tribe, Colloquy: Constitutional Calculus: Equal Justice or Economic
Efficiency?, 98 HARV. L. REv. 592, 610 (1985) (alteration in original).
147. Volokh, supra note 3, at 1036
148. Id. at 1079-80. See Frank B. Cross, Decisionmaking in the U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1457, 1477 (2003) (pointing to a study of district courts
concluding that judges use "cognitive shortcuts to process imperfect information"); Id. at
1478 (quoting Justice Frankfurter: "[H]ow powerful is the pull of the unconscious and how
treacherous the rationale process").
149. Volokh, supra note 3, at 1079-80.
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Scholars refer to this attitude changing effect as the "is-ought fallacy:"'' 50 the
erroneous assumption that simply because the law permits some government
action, that action and similar ones must be proper.' 51 If the is-ought mindset
truly influences decision makers, one can easily envision how "slippage"
might occur. Implementation of the initial decision upholding databases,
including DNA profiles only from felons, would lead people to assume the
propriety of this decision and its justifications, making implementation of the
15 2
"danger case," a database including DNA profiles from everyone, easier.
In essence, "what starts off as using exceptional methods in exceptional
circumstances may, with time, be internalized and applied in a growing
number of cases."' 53 The risk of the attitude-altering effect increases when
decision makers face a complex issue,' 5 4 e.g., whether the Fourth
Amendment permits suspicionless searches of an individual's genetic
makeup. 155 Hence, the majority of these decision-makers will lack a "welldeveloped, comprehensive philosoph[y]" on the subject, making them more
likely to defer to the expert judgment of prior courts and the legislature. 56
For example, recent judicial decisions upholding suspicionless searches
in the context of criminal DNA databases almost always refer to past
decisions made by lower courts or sister circuits, 57 and also to the fact that
every state and the federal legislature has enacted DNA collection statutes, to
bolster the legitimacy of their decision. Moreover, the fact that legal
challenges to state DNA collection statutes, even the broader laws
encompassing anyone ever convicted of a non-violent felony, have been
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. See also THE CONG. Q. RESEARCHER, supra note 4, at 457 (discussing
predictions that the public sentiment toward DNA databases will change as a result of their
"creeping expansion").
153. See Gross, supra note 112, at 1508-09 (discussing slippery slope theory and the use
of interrogational torture).
154. One court, asserting that "DNA collection statues present very difficult legal
issues," declined to address certain "important" Fourth Amendment privacy issues in the
absence of "meaningful adversarial briefing." Nason, 102 P.3d at 965,
155. See Volokh, supra note 3, at 1080-81 (asserting that the attitude-altering effect
applies to "less empirical judgments" regarding complex issues like the permissible scope
of police searches).
156. Id. at 1079-80, 1083. See Gross, supra note 112, at 1555 n.218 (observing that
times of crisis cause judges to increase their "reliance on cognitive heuristics as a means of
countering the lack of sufficient time to properly evaluate the situation"). Although
Volokh focuses more on how the slippery slope influences the average voter, the same
concepts apply to judicial decision makers because, albeit to a lesser degree, judges suffer
from the same "rational ignorance" and also tend to defer to the first batch of judicial
decisions (binding or not) on the issue and also to the well-informed and "expert"
judgments of the legislature. Volokh, supra note 3, at 1082-83.
157. See Miller v. United States, 259 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1174 (D. Kan. 2003) ("Nearly
all courts have found DNA collection statutes to be reasonable searches under the Fourth
Amendment and thus, constitutional. ..."); Boling v. Romer, 101 F.3d 1336, 1340 (10th
Cir. 1996) (asserting, "[w]e are persuaded to reach the same result, with respect to the
statute at issue here, as our sister circuits"); Garvin, 812 N.E.2d at 781 (beginning its
analysis by noting that all fifty states have enacted similar DNA collection statutes that
have been found constitutional).

The John Marshall Law Review

[39:115

"uniformly successful," advances the notion that a more comprehensive
database is legally and socially permissible. 58 Because the existing state of
the law 5 9 calls for weighing a given individual's expectation of privacy
against what will always be a "monumental" government interest in crime
solving and crime-prevention,' 60 future decision makers will defer to what
has become a familiar legal mantra because it is proper.' 6' And, as
previously noted, the balance inevitably strikes in favor of the government
under this legal reasoning.
Perhaps recognizing the generalities afflicting the applied legal rules,
some judges attempt to limit the scope of their justification to only
individuals convicted of violent felonies like rape and murder. Others insert
collateral justifications, citing to the fact that the only individuals subject to
inclusion in the database have been legally adjudicated as major threats to
society after receiving adequate due process. 162 These limitations, however,
will not be enough to "notch" the slope and prevent judicial endorsement and
implementation of a population-wide database down the road. 63 As time
passes, the details of the reasoning and the debates over the legitimacy of
databases will be forgotten - "only the law itself will endure; and then
advocates for future law B may cite law A as endorsing quite a different
justification."'164 In other words, soon the collateral details of the DNA cases
will fall by the wayside; the dissents and concurrences will blur. We will be
left with a governmental interest in crime solving that swallows every
individual's right to privacy; and a society made up of individuals who

158. Rothstein & Camahan, supra note 21, at 128-29.

159. The "existing state of the law" refers to application of the "special needs"
exception and the traditional totality of the circumstances approach, which both involve a
balancing of the privacy interests against the government interests at stake.
160. See Kincade, 379 F.3d at 838 (asserting that the government/public interests
advanced by the DNA Act are "undeniably compelling" and "overwhelming"); Marcotte,
193 F.3d at 79 (finding that the DNA statute passes the balancing test because sex
offenders have a high rate of recidivism and because "DNA evidence is particularly
usefil" in solving crime); Shaffer v. Suffle, 148 F.3d 1180, 1181 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing
two cases for its assertion that the compelled collection of a DNA sample pursuant to state
statute does not violate the Fourth Amendment); Rise, 59 F.3d at 1561 (stressing the
government and public interest in crime prevention).
161. For both appellate courts and courts of last resort, the existence of positive
horizontal precedent has a "statistically and substantively significant effect on judicial
decisionmaking." Cross, supra note 148, at 1469-7 1. The existence of negative decisions,
however, had relatively little impact on the outcome of future decisions. Id. at 1471.
162. See Raines, 857 A.2d at 48-49 (Wilner, J., concurring) (agreeing with the majority
on the constitutionality of searches under the DNA collection statutes but finding the issue
to be "a much closer one" for him, and consoling himself with the idea that criminals, "as
a group defined by their own judicially-determined conduct," pose a special threat to
public safety).
163. See Kincade, 379 F.3d at 843 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (asserting that, although
his "colleagues claim to authorize merely the 'compulsory DNA profiling of certain
conditionally-released federal offenders' . . . [w]e would be lucky indeed if it were
possible to so limit the effect of their opinions").
164. Volokh, supra note 3, at 1089.
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165
cannot even identify a problem with it.

4.

Small Change Tolerance

Civil libertarians often remind us that "[p]eople will let their liberty be
taken away slowly, though they would have resisted the changes to their
freedom had they been proposed all at once. ' 66 So, unlike the attitudealtering slippery slope, this type of slippery slope does not persuade decision
makers to eventually support a next step.1 67 Rather, a series of steps warrants
less attention and, therefore, less opposition. 68 This happens because
experience teaches us to view gradual change as less worrisome. 169 One can
also attribute tolerance of small changes to the natural attempts of a decision
maker to avoid seeming petty or fanatical, preferring that others view them
as "moderate."' 70 Small change tolerance, then, intermingles with the
extension of precedent slippery slope. When courts apply rules that are
inherently vague, or even those seeming relatively clear but vague at the
margins, there is "uncertainty on the border between the covered and the
uncovered."171
Because existing precedent and the terms associated with the applicable
legal tests leave a realm of "moderate" possible decisions, seemingly
reasonable to most observers, judges deciding on a subsequent broader
proposal, such as the inclusion of all arrestees in DNA databases, will enjoy
considerable flexibility in where to draw the line. 172 In other words, "if the

165. See Erosion of Privacy: Justice Kozinski on DNA, FREEDOM SIGHT, August 20,
2004,
available at
http://s88369986.onlinehome.us/freedomsight/comments.php?
id=589_0_1_0_C [hereinafter Judge Kozinski on DNA] (explaining that when it comes to
civil liberties today it seems that the nation has become accustomed to infringements).
"It's a case of redefining 'normal .
' I..d. Hence, the nation's notion of liberty has
become "skewed." Id.
166. Volokh & Newman, supra note 45, at 23. See Judge Kozinski on DNA, supra note
165 (warning that, when it comes to civil liberties today, the nation is becoming
accustomed to infringement, and government efforts at "redefining 'normal"' have caused
the nation to develop a "skewed" notion of liberty).
167. Volokh, supra note 3, at 1105-06.
168. Id. at 1105.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1110. A desire to encourage continuity and stability in the law and a concern
for their reputation in the legal community may drive judges to adhere to what they
perceive as the present legal norm. Cross, supra note 148, at 1474-75. For example, one
scholar observed: "[W]e may sometimes internalize norms to the point where we follow
them unthinkingly, but often we adhere to them because we desire the respect and good
opinion of others or ourselves." Id. at 1475 (quoting DAVID E. KLEIN, MAKING LAW IN
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 21 (2002)).
171. Volokh, supra note 3, at 1112. See Kaye & Smith, supra note 24, at 415 (asserting
that, although the recidivism theory seems more protective of individual liberty, it also
fails to limit its application to arrestees or convicted offenders).
172. See Kincade, 379 F.3d at 873 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (criticizing the plurality's
"highly expansive opinion"); Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A
Critique of Interpretiveand Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 821-22 (asserting
that the manipulability of legal rules allows judges great freedom to fulfill their
preferences while remaining within those rules).
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distance between this case and the precedents is small enough," the general
public, lawyers, and other judges will defer to that decision whether or not
they would fully agree after reviewing the issue de novo.'7 3 Therefore, if the
judge chooses to draw the line between arrestees and regular citizens, it
would not grab enough attention to generate opposition. Instead of taking
the time to perform a thorough examination of the legitimacy of where to
draw the line, judges and voters considering the issue will defer to the prior
judgment because it represents only a small change within the realm of
"moderate" decisions. 174 Consequently, the nation can slip further and
further down the slope without any barriers, until it is too late. Hitting
the
75
bottom becomes inevitable and the "danger case" becomes a reality. 1
For example, once a court validates recent state legislation calling for
collection of DNA from all arrestees, the "small change" mandating DNA
collection from everyone will seem to logically and naturally follow. This is
especially true when considering arrest statistics indicating that roughly 90%
of urban black males and 50% of all white males will be arrested at some
time for either a felony or a misdemeanor. 176 Further, if legislation were to
mandate DNA sampling for traffic offenses as well, nearly every American
would eventually find their way into the database. 177 Soon, people will no
longer associate genetic "harvesting" and government monitoring with
hardened criminals newly released from federal prisons - it will be a
neighbor, a family member, their 17-year-old child, or themselves. Judge
Kozinski, in his dissenting opinion, fears this type of slippery slope the most:
Later, when further expansions of CODIS are proposed, information from the
database will have been credited with solving hundreds or thousands of crimes,
and we will have become inured to the idea that the government is entitled to
hold large databases of DNA fingerprints.... And when the inevitable
expansion comes, we will look to the regime we approved today as the new
baseline and say, this too must be OK because it's just one small178
step beyond
the last thing we approved. . . The fishbowl will look like home.

173. Volokh, supra note 3, at 1112-14.
174. Scholar Eugene Volokh suggests that judges find it both politically and
normatively tempting to defer to judicial decisions because they can avoid offending the

majority view and because it allows them to shift the "burden of drawing and defending
distinctions that don't rest on any crisp rules." Eugene Volokh, Crime Severity and
ConstitutionalLine-Drawing, 90 VA. L. REV. 1957, 1981-82 (2004).
175. See Recent Case, Tenth Circuit Applies Reasonable Suspicion Standard to Stops
for Minor Traffic Infractions, United States v. Callarman, 273 F.3d 1284 (10th Cir. 2001),

cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 1950 (2002), 116 HARV. L. REv. 697, 704 (2002) (observing that
recent Fourth Amendment jurisprudence reflects an erosion of Fourth Amendment
protections and the requisite levels of suspicion preceding government searches and
warning that "[s]mall doctrinal changes can be and have been used over time to create

substantial revision in the law").
176. Kaye & Smith, supra note 24, at 455-56.
177. Id. at 456. Taking a DNA sample from anyone stopped for a traffic violation
seems much more feasible in light of new DNA sampling techniques that simply apply a
sticky patch to the arm to lift cells. Quarmby, supra note 19, 20.
178. Kincade, 379 F.3d at 873 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
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III. SUPREME COURT MUST PROTECT FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS BY
"NOTCHING" THE SLIPPERY SLOPE AND SENDING STATES TO THE Tow ROPE

By describing the characteristics of a slippery slope and exposing the
subtle and interrelated forces causing the "slippage" toward a populationwide DNA database, this Comment attempts to revive a tired metaphor in
order to reveal the risk of an undesirable future. One goal of this theoretical
journey down the slope from the original proposition to the "danger case," is
to increase the potency of Judge Kozinski's warning that "[t]his isn't an issue
we can leave for another day."' 79 Now, after making the "mechanisms"
pushing us down the slope towards a population-wide database more visible,
it is time to call for rescue. Although recent judicial decisions seem to have
cleared the steep path ahead
by brushing aside Fourth Amendment
80
protections, it is not too late.'

Instead of permitting lower courts and state legislatures to expedite the
trip to the bottom, the United States Supreme Court must safeguard what
remains of Fourth Amendment privacy rights by notching the slippery slope
enhanced by prior justifications of DNA extraction and database entry. It
must reject the statutory farming of arrestees' and suspects' DNA into state
' 18
and nationwide databases. This requires erecting a constitutional "barrier '
preventing the expansion of DNA databases beyond inclusion of convicted
felons through a declaration that all other categories of society enjoy a
measure of genetic privacy that outweighs any government interest in forced
DNA collection, whether related to law enforcement or some other special
need. By taking a stand on DNA database expansion, the Court can
safeguard a modem definition of privacy182 from legal analyses83 leaving
privacy vulnerable to complete extinction in the age of technology.
The Supreme Court must "notch" the DNA database slippery slope
because the present judicial reasoning and legal theories used to legitimize
law enforcement's harvesting of DNA from convicted felons fail to protect
the general citizenry from inclusion in a government-run database. 84 This
179. Id.
180. According to Judge Kozinski, however, "[tihe time to put the cork back in the
brass bottle is now - before the genie escapes." Id. at 875.
181. See Volokh, supra note 3, at 1131 (asserting that "strong constitutional protection
of substantive rights" is one method of notching the slippery slope).
182. The modem definition of legal privacy is characterized by "openly subjective,
relativistic, and indeterminate premises," leaving it vulnerable to further encroachments in
the future. See Pongrace, supra note 70, at 1203 (criticizing the modem definition of
privacy and the decline of the distinction between the public and the private realms of
human activity).
183. Jill Lynn Tyler, The Healthcare Information Technology Context: A Framework
for Viewing Legal Aspects of Telemedicine and Teleradiology, 34th Hawaii International

Conference on System Sciences (2001), available at http://csdl2.computer.org/comp/
proceedingshicss/2001/0981/06/09816010.pdf (asserting that the judicial system is "still
refining its approach to issues concerning technology and privacy" in the "Information
Age" where private information can be accessed with ease).
184. See Eugene Volokh, New Post at The Volokh Conspiracy: Judge Kozinski On
Slippery Slopes and Privacy, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY, August 18, 2004,

http://www.mail-archive.com/volokh@lists.powerblogs.com/msgOO828.html

(discussing
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entails mandating states that have enacted, or plan to enact, DNA collection
statutes applicable to individuals outside the category of convicted felons to
"climb back up" the slope.'8 5 The Court must also steer the federal
government toward the tow rope, because the Bush administration has
pushed for FBI access to the entire range of samples included in state DNA
databases, which contain samples from arrestees, misdemeanants, and other
individuals not included under the Federal DNA Act. 186
First, however, the Supreme Court must further clarify the "special
needs" doctrine by declaring it inapplicable to DNA databases. This is
because DNA harvesting is undeniably entangled with the normal needs of
law enforcement; namely, efforts to solve past and future crimes. 87 Second,
the Court must impose limits on the judicial balancing act 18 that permits
DNA harvesting by creating an absolute category "that would objectively
establish [an] inviolable zone[] of privacy."' 89 For example, unless one has
committed a felony involving a deadly weapon or a crime against humanity,
then the individual's expectation of genetic privacy should withstand
whatever interest the government advances in its effort to fill the databases.
Only by definitively quantifying the individual privacy expectation in this
way can the Court protect free citizens from the crushing weight of the

the Kincade opinion and Judge Kozinski's fear that the majority's opinion could apply to a
requirement that everyone submit DNA, not just convicted felons, for inclusion in a
government-run database); Kravets, supra note 25, at 2 (describing Judge Reinhardt's
argument that the majority's balancing approach could give the government the authority
to bypass the Fourth Amendment and could subject everyone to government DNA
harvesting).
185. Presently, many states "prodded by the voracious appetite of law enforcement,"
advocate for more aggressive and comprehensive DNA databases that will quickly
approach the equivalent of an all-inclusive database. Kincade, 379 F.3d at 873 (Kozinski,
J., dissenting); Taylor, supra note 29, at 543. For example, the state of California recently
passed a measure, entitled "Proposition 69," that expands the list of crimes requiring DNA
submission from nonviolent offenders, juveniles, uncharged suspects, and anyone arrested
on felony charges. Calif DNA Plan Seriously Invasive, TALKLEFT: THE POLITICS OF
CRIME, December 23, 2003, http://talkleft.com/newarchives/004763.html (last visited
Dec. 29, 2005).
186. Christine Rosen, Liberty, Privacy, and DNA Databases, THE NEW ATLANTIS: A J.
OF TECH. & SOC'Y (2003), available at http://www.ccr.buffalo.edu/Worshop03/
newatlantis.html.
187. See Kincade, 379 F.3d at 855 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (asserting that the
"government maintained from the outset of this litigation that the purpose of the searches
authorized by the DNA Act is to 'help law enforcement solve unresolved and future
cases"').
188. The court's balancing of an individual's privacy rights against the government's
substantial interests in DNA collection makes database expansion efforts easier to justify.
For example, according to Charles Black, "as a matter of attitude, the language of
'balancing' isapt language, easily conformable language, for the job of cutting down to
what somebody thinks is comfortable size the claims to sometimes awkward human
freedom which the Bill of Rights sets out to protect." See Gross, supra note 112, at 1507
(quoting Charles Black to support the assertion that "it is easier to justify the use of torture
when engaging in 'balancing"').
189. Pongrace, supra note 70, at 1211.
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government interest190 in DNA collection under the Fourth Amendment
balancing test.'99
The Supreme Court must take these affirmative steps because the
privacy loss that comes with DNA database expansion goes beyond other
infringements society is willing to tolerate.' 92
First, the risk of abuse associated with DNA collection is both
unprecedented and substantial. 9 3 DNA holds more biological, and possibly
even psychological, 194 information about a particular individual than
anything the government has ever demanded access to. This opens the door
to a whole new world of government surveillance capabilities and
discriminatory behavior. For example, both "employers and insurers have
struggled intensely during the era of the human genome against laws which
95
would restrict them from accessing or using genetic information."'
Second, the knowledge, and potential knowledge, the government amasses
about its citizens in DNA databases disrupts the delicate power balance and
196
the unique relationship between the American government and its citizens.
Because DNA "will be used to solve crimes that have not yet been
197
committed... it requires searches of people who are not yet suspects."'
Consequently, Americans will come to feel as if they really do reside in a
"nation of suspects."' 98 This type of governmental intrusion goes to the very
"core" of national identity and human dignity. 199 Thus, the unique treachery

190. Law enforcement consistently argues that DNA collection furthers the government
interest in crime solving and prevention, that DNA searches are reasonable, and that "the
need to find and prosecute the right offenders trumps the privacy concerns of individuals."
McAree, supra note 24, at 4.
191. When it comes to Fourth Amendment privacy concerns arising in the context of
new technology and government surveillance capabilities, legal scholars have suggested
that courts should preserve Fourth Amendment protections by conducting a more
substantive analysis of a citizen's privacy expectations, which would result in finding
more areas of government intrusion violative of the "reasonable expectation of privacy"
test. Peter P. Swire, Correspondence:Katz is Dead. Long Live Katz, 102 MICH. L. REV.
904, 923 (2004).
192. For instance, society tolerates the loss of anonymity associated with fingerprint
databases and the use of social security numbers.
193. For example, privacy advocates note that researchers are now identifying genetic
markers for hair color, height, and other identifying features that authorities will soon want
to search DNA samples for. Willing, supra note 30, at 1. This will provide government
with an even greater ability to monitor its citizens.
194. See Brave, supra note 33 (asserting that researchers might attempt to "gain access
to the DNA collection from a variety of felons, such as serial killers or pedophiles, to
determine whether or not there is any genetic contribution").
195. Id.
196. Kincade, 379 F.3d at 843 (Reinhardt, J.,dissenting). For example, allowing the
government to collect and centralize large amounts of private information about its free
citizens permitted "[o]ur government's surveillance and shameful harassment" of
suspected communists in the middle of the twentieth century. It also assisted the
government in rounding up Japanese Americans during the Palmer Raids of World War II.
Id. at 843.
197. Edwards, supra note 1276, at 5.
198. Kaye, supra note 4, at 456-57
199. See Urbonya, supra note 68, at 162 (describing the importance of privacy to human
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of the DNA slippery slope making it worthy of Supreme Court attention
comes from the increase in government power, genetic discrimination, and
the distortion of national identity that it leads to.
Accepting the trade-off is not the answer to the issue of DNA database
expansion. 200 A number of proposals attempt to legitimize population-wide
databases on the justification that national security trumps any privacy
interest one holds in their genetic profile. Perhaps this solution appears more
appealing than ever before in light of America's post-September 11th
insecurities, the ongoing War on Terror, and the impact of the Patriot Act on
privacy expectations.
Such proposals, however, view the Fourth
technicality, '20 ' a "pointless annoyance" 20 2 "mere
as
a
Amendment
obstructing the path to more efficient crime fighting and greater national
security. Such a sentiment
strips the Fourth Amendment from its substantive
20 3
republic.
our
to
value
We do not know what the future holds - when it comes to crime rates,
terrorist threats, or the mapping of the human genome - but we do know our
past. We know why the Constitution's framers included a Bill of Rights because it is the only notch preventing that unique, but frail concept we call
liberty, from speeding down the icy slopes of government power. More than
any other provision, the Fourth Amendment's protection against search and
seizure has been labeled "profoundly antigovernment." 2°4 Perhaps because it
is an area where citizens' relationship with their government "achieves its
most stark and physical form." 20 5 This is true because the amendment
protects "core interests essential to human flourishing, interests in privacy,
property, and freedom of movement., 20 6 If the Supreme Court and American
citizens don't acknowledge the realities of the slippery slope metaphor, then
a population-wide DNA database may well plant the seed for a future police
state, and will surely spell the death of Fourth Amendment privacy.

dignity); Kincade, 379 F.3d at 851 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (asserting that government
control over its citizens' DNA affords it "monumental powers to intrude into the core of
those intimate concerns which lie at the heart of the right to privacy").
200. Rizzo, supra note 49, at 579 (explaining that "accepting the trade-off' represents
one method of coping with slippery slope issues).
201. Andrew E. Taslitz, Respect and the Fourth Amendment, 94 J. CRiM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY
15, 18 (2003) (discussing modem trends in Fourth Amendment
application).
202. See id. at 16 (discussing the early roots of the Fourth Amendment).
203. Id. at 29 (discussing the treatment of the Fourth Amendment as a mere
technicality). One court solemnly noted that the increased pressure on law enforcement
officers and advances in forensic science have caused a "fateful confluence of decreased
concern for private constitutional rights" and a pronounced denigration of this country's
once internationally esteemed legal protections. Riley, 906 F.2d at 855. Thus, more than
ever, "[s]ensitivity to the dangers to civil rights" is vital. Id.
204. Bacigal, supra note 67, at 362. One scholar defined the Fourth Amendment as "the
part of that venerable document that comes most into play when evaluating the boundaries,
if any, of the government's prerogatives of searching and seizing in the name of
maintaining order and safety." Young, supra note 136, at 1020.
205. Bagical, supra note 67, at 362.
206. Taslitz, supra note 201, at 23.
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However narrow the first opening, there will never be wanting hands to push it
wide, and those will be the hands of the strong, the sagacious, and the
interested... Something peculiar may be found in every case, and the future
judges will look to the [newly adopted] principle alone, and lay aside2 the
7
guards and qualifications. The people will not comprehend such subtleties. 0

207. See Volokh, supra note 3, at 1088 (quoting Harrington v. Comm'r, 13 S.C.L. (2
McCord) 400, 406 (1823)).

